For the attention of:
Marta Kos
European Commissioner for Enlargement
Gert Jan Koopman
Director-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood
Katarína Mathernová
EU Ambassador and Head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine
Brussels, 28 February 2025
One year of the Ukraine Facility Regulation: civil society recommendations for improvement
Dear Commissioner Kos, Director-General Koopman and Ambassador Mathernová,
We, the undersigned Ukrainian and European civil society organisations, are writing about implementation of the Ukraine Facility Regulation as it reaches its first anniversary.
In light of recent geopolitical developments, the Ukraine Facility is more important than ever as a key instrument of support for Ukraine, providing EUR 50 billion for 2024–2027. This funding helps Ukraine maintain macro-financial stability, promote recovery and strengthen governance on its path to EU membership.
However, we believe the Ukraine Facility could have an even greater impact. We therefore call on the European Commission to consider the following recommendations:
- Improve the quality of documents developed under the Ukraine Plan to ensure effective implementation and lasting reforms.
- Improve the transparency and accessibility of investments envisaged under the Ukraine Plan for the public and civil society organisations.
- Integrate climate and environmental objectives, including biodiversity conservation and the ‘do no significant harm’ principle, ensuring their application to 20% of total funding under the investments envisaged in the Ukraine Plan.
- Create a platform for civil society organisations to submit proposals and a procedure to transparently track and incorporate them into official documents.
- Ensure Ukrainian municipalities can access 20% of direct financial support under the Ukraine Plan by developing new methodologies for submitting project concepts for public investment funding.
- Prioritise grant support for Ukrainian civil society organisations.
We hope these recommendations will also be reflected in the Commission’s annual report to the European Parliament and Council on progress towards the Ukraine Facility Regulation’s objectives.
More detailed recommendations are set out in the annex to this letter.
Thank you sincerely for your attention and support.
CEE Bankwatch Network
SaveDnipro
T&E
Association for International Affairs (AMO)
Centre for Environmental Initiatives ‘Ecoaction’
NGO Ekoltava Ecoclub, Rivne
NGO Urban Reform
NGO CELA
International Charitable Organization “Environment – People – Law” (EPL)
RePower Ukraine Foundation
Fund RcErBs
ForestCom Eurogroup for Animals
WWF European Policy Office
Volonteurope
Agency for sustainable development of the Carpathian region “FORZA”
Institute for development of national economy
Zero Waste Alliance Ukraine
Greenpeace Ukraine
NGO Plato
Clean Air Action Group
Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum
National Ecological Centre of Ukraine
IVIC UNION “INNOVATION AARHUS NETWORK OF UKRAINE TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES AND THE CITY KIEV”
Young European Federalists – JEF Europe
Zero Waste ZP NGO
ANNEX
1. Timely, high-quality reforms
The Ukraine Plan, adopted by Ukraine’s Government, includes reforms, recovery plans, indicators scheduled for implementation and commitments concerning EU accession requirements.
European Commission assessments, subsequently endorsed by the Council of the EU, have confirmed that Ukraine continues to meet both the preconditions for EU support and the conditions for quarterly payments under the Ukraine Plan. While arguments can be made that all required steps and reforms have been completed, we wish to highlight the relatively poor quality of the documents produced and shortcomings in effective implementation and the sustainability of reforms.
Unfortunately, Ukraine’s National Energy and Climate Plan until 2030, a Facility milestone, lacks important provisions that would bring it closer to EU requirements and standards. More ambitious development of decentralised renewable generation is possible, including through energy communities as provided for in the Clean Energy for All Europeans package. Ukraine is also obliged to implement these measures as an Energy Community member. Just transition principles must be fully integrated into the document rather than limited to one policy initiative or measure in a particular region.
Similarly, under the criteria in the annex to the proposal for a Council decision approving the Ukraine Plan assessment, Ukraine’s National Transport Strategy until 2030 lacks the overall strategic direction and specific policy steps needed to meet European and international transport decarbonisation targets, even though the strategy itself explicitly identifies decarbonisation as a necessary implementation stage.
Another example is the concept note defining the scope of derogations from the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directives. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources must publish a concept note based on public consultation to identify exemptions from EIA and SEA rules. It was supposed to list projects and justifications, explain the scope and rationale of derogations and set time limits. Instead, the note provides no evidence of compliance with the principles of the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions or the EIA Directive, and contains inconsistencies that reduce its impact.
Reform assessments must therefore consider not only formal completion but also alignment with EU standards, effectiveness and the long-term sustainability of changes. To support this, the European Commission should immediately establish a monitoring tool showing progress in implementing the Ukraine Plan.
Finally, Ukrainian authorities responsible for reforms must actively conduct regular, meaningful consultations with stakeholders, including the Verkhovna Rada, regional, local, municipal and other public authorities, social partners and civil society, on all measures under the Ukraine Plan.
2. Transparency of investments envisaged under the Ukraine Plan
The Ukraine Plan aims to support recovery and reconstruction investments by Ukrainian authorities, private companies, municipalities, state-owned enterprises and others. Although this framework should follow the Plan’s priorities and contribute to its objectives and implementation, project selection remains opaque. Civil society, together with other social and economic partners, still lacks access to project proposals. Members of the European Parliament and Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada have only observer status on the Steering Committee, limiting their influence on decisions taken by elected officials.
To address these shortcomings, we strongly urge the European Commission to publish lists of all approved programmes and projects and the responsible financial institutions approved under the investment framework envisaged in the Ukraine Plan.
We also recommend that the EU improve transparency and access to information on financial support for Ukraine through institutions such as the European Investment Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, European bilateral financial institutions, national development banks and export credit agencies. Funding sources must be clearly identified.
3. Environmental and sustainability criteria in reconstruction
Since the Facility’s launch, the European Commission has consistently stressed that implementation of the EUR 50 billion fund must proceed alongside Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations, delivery of its nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement and National Energy and Climate Plan, and the ‘build back better’ principle.
The Regulation expressly provides that at least 20% of total support under the investments envisaged in the Ukraine Plan must contribute to climate mitigation and adaptation, environmental protection, including biodiversity conservation, and the green transition. However, measures to implement these investments have not yet been developed.
Accordingly, investments under the Ukraine Plan must clearly integrate climate and environmental objectives, including biodiversity conservation and the ‘do no significant harm’ principle. This approach must apply to 20% of total funding.
A new methodology for preparing, selecting and approving public sector projects in accordance with the ‘do no significant harm’ principle and the EU Taxonomy for sustainable activities must also be developed and integrated into Pillars I and II of the Facility.
4. Civil society participation
Under the Regulation, the Commission must ensure that Ukrainian civil society, including NGOs, can directly report identified irregularities through appropriate permanent channels and send its views on implementation of the Ukraine Plan and the Ukrainian Government’s assessment of its measures. Yet an effective mechanism for civil society participation in the Ukraine Facility has still not been established.
In particular, there is still no platform for civil society organisations to submit proposals or a procedure for properly considering and incorporating them into official documents.
Formal civil society involvement in monitoring Ukraine Facility implementation must also be provided for under Pillar III of the Regulation.
5. Strengthening subregional and civic engagement in Ukraine
Ukraine has begun planning public investment through its reformed Public Investment Management system. Effective public financial management is a key principle enshrined in the Ukraine Facility Regulation. This is especially important because 20% of non-repayable financial assistance under the Ukraine Plan for subnational authorities’ recovery, reconstruction and modernisation needs is directed to local government.
Ukraine can improve public investment project planning, selection and monitoring by introducing monitoring committees of the kind used under EU funds. In EU member states and the European Commission, public involvement follows the European Code of Conduct on Partnership. Involving public authorities, economic and social partners and civil society organisations at national, regional and local levels throughout the programme cycle — preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation — will encourage closer cooperation and strengthen everyone’s capacity.
Existing local recovery initiatives play a key role in continuing decentralisation reform. Under the subsidiarity principle, local communities best understand their development needs and should have a decisive role in choosing projects for implementation and financing.
In practice, municipalities must have direct access to support mechanisms, with top-down interference minimised. If state bodies or regional administrations unilaterally decide which municipal projects receive funding, this undermines decentralisation and increases corruption risks.
Rather than centralising decisions, the state can best support local initiatives by establishing transparent regulatory frameworks and effective institutional oversight. In many EU countries, central governments act as referees, ensuring that projects meet sustainability criteria, procurement is transparent and the best environmental standards are followed. Ukraine’s Public Investment Management system could likewise benefit from a strong but proportionate central role focused on setting standards and independently evaluating projects.
Solar power plants illustrate opportunities lost through excessive centralisation. Projects delivered by civil society organisations with water utilities and hospitals show that communities can build and launch a solar plant at a water utility in about six months when bureaucratic obstacles do not intervene.
During wartime, these plants strengthen energy resilience, keep critical infrastructure operating and reduce electricity costs. Municipalities already using solar systems report substantial savings and more reliable services. Yet solar panels donated by the European Commission several years ago remain uninstalled, illustrating how central government bottlenecks can delay or even block beneficial projects.
Municipalities often lack institutional capacity, particularly experience in large-scale procurement and long-term project management. Excluding local authorities from key decisions does not solve this problem.
Municipalities must be informed about the Public Investment Management system and gain greater access to direct funding sources. The European Commission should intensify engagement with Ukrainian municipalities to guarantee access to direct Ukraine Facility funding and familiarise them with new methodologies for submitting public investment project concepts. In parallel, it should encourage Ukrainian authorities to apply the partnership principle when using Facility funding.
Finally, well-structured capacity-building support combined with targeted technical assistance and financial instruments can substantially strengthen municipal authorities’ capabilities.