The position of Ukraine’s environmental movement ahead of URC 2025.
Ukraine has made significant efforts to prepare for the EU integration screening under Chapter 27, Environment and Climate Change. Despite successfully completing it in June 2025, most environmental reforms are stalling.
In the area of horizontal environmental legislation,, where transposition is relatively advanced, three key problems remain: restrictions on access to environmental information under martial law, derogations from EIA and SEA, and restricted or absent environmental inspections.
Since 2022, because of register updates and national security considerations, EIA and SEA documents and a substantial amount of other environmental information on the EcoSystem digital platform have been accessible only after logging in. Yet these registers should be freely accessible, as their purpose is to inform the public about the procedures and opportunities to participate.
Because of martial law, installation operators remain exempt from the obligation to submit reports to the National Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR).
Ukraine should resolve these problems because, during its green reconstruction, access to environmental information in public electronic databases must be complete and require no login. The current situation also clearly fails to meet EU requirements for disseminating environmental information to the public.
Since the adoption of the EU integration laws on EIA and SEA in 2017–2018, we have observed various attempts, sometimes successful, to narrow their scope. This trend accelerated after the full-scale invasion, when derogations from EIA and SEA began to be discussed officially. In late 2024, the European Commission stated that EIA and SEA procedures should apply to all plans, programmes and projects, including those concerning Ukraine’s reconstruction. It also said the existing derogation regime was incompatible with EU requirements, required review and should not be widened, and that further derogations should be avoided, particularly in forestry, agriculture and land management. Yet in 2025, the existing derogation regime has not been reviewed for either EIA or SEA. Moreover, in February 2025, oil and gas extraction facilities were added to the activities exempt from EIA, and another bill excluding logging from EIA was registered in Parliament.
Despite its promises, Ukraine has still not launched environmental monitoringreform. The relevant law was adopted in 2022, but implementation has been postponed indefinitely.
Ukraine still lacks even a vision of how to harmonise domestic legislation with the EU acquis on liability for environmental damage and environmental crime. Senior officials mention environmental oversight reform in almost every speech, yet no legislative initiatives are visible. Meanwhile, because of martial law, the State Environmental Inspectorate has conducted no scheduled inspections for more than three years. Unscheduled inspections are extremely difficult even in cases of blatant violations. Ukraine should review the moratorium on such inspections, at least in relatively safe regions, and begin serious work on transposing the directives on environmental liability and environmental crime.
Ukraine has already lost a significant share of its biodiversity, and the destruction of wildlife continues at an accelerating pace. Seeking to compensate for agricultural land lost in occupied regions, Parliament simplified the use of natural areas for agriculture in rear regions, worsening the shortage of habitats. Meanwhile, legislation on land conservation and ecosystem restoration remains complex and burdened by post-Soviet bureaucracy. Urgent steps are needed to monitor and control arable land and stop the ploughing of protected areas, water fund land and meadows; control pesticide, herbicide and chemical fertiliser use and move towards EU standards and targets, including a 50% reduction in pesticide and chemical fertiliser use and an increase in organic farming; simplify legislation on land conservation and restoration of natural ecosystems through rewilding; and test drinking water sources and natural waters for nitrates, pesticides and herbicides.
It is also important to inventory all water bodies in Ukraine and check compliance with water protection legislation, restore wetlands and protect rivers as climate adaptation measures, and prevent the destruction of natural ecosystems in the Ukrainian Carpathians by wind and hydropower development. In particular, a moratorium should be imposed on wind farms along mountain ridges and hydropower plants on mountain rivers. We must resume progress towards protecting 30% of Ukraine’s territory and adopt legislation on Ukraine’s Emerald Network.
For post-war reconstruction of areas affected by hostilities, we stress the importance of clearing chemical contamination and determining whether land is suitable for use; ensuring that chemical laboratories have the capacity for comprehensive testing of wartime soil, water and air pollution; and operating specialist sites for the environmentally safe storage and disposal of debris and waste from destruction and hostilities.
Despite partial approximation of Ukrainian legislation on ambient air quality, Ukraine must continue work on implementing regulations for air quality monitoring and their enforcement. Many measures in this area are also being postponed until after the war. For example, the Government’s 2024 resolution on the operation of the state environmental monitoring system and its subsystems will enter into force only six months after martial law ends. Ukraine has still not implemented Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe with regard to PM2.5 emission limits and ambient concentrations. Nor has it transposed Directive 94/63/EC on controlling volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions from petrol storage and its distribution from terminals to service stations. Ukraine is decades behind in ratifying and implementing important protocols to the UNECE Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, covering heavy metals, VOCs, ground-level ozone, acidification and eutrophication. It also neglects its emission and emission projection reporting commitments under the Convention, as the European Commission noted in its 2024 report.
Following adoption in 2022 and entry into effect in July 2023 of Ukraine’s Law ‘On Waste Management’, the Government moved to developing and approving state planning documents. In December 2024, a new National Waste Management Plan until 2033 was approved, including a Waste Prevention Programme until 2033 and a Programme to Reduce Biowaste Landfilling. Regional and local waste management plans should be developed on this basis by approximately the end of 2026.
To launch the mechanisms and instruments envisaged by the law and the National Plan, however, the Government should proceed with drafting and adopting legislation and implementing regulations. These include laws restricting the production and circulation of single-use plastic products in Ukraine; on batteries, accumulators and their waste; extractive industry waste; electrical and electronic equipment and its waste; end-of-life vehicles and waste tyres and oils; textile waste; rules for a packaging waste deposit system; state and sectoral building standards for hazardous, non-hazardous and inert waste landfills; technical operating rules for waste treatment facilities; and other measures. Work in this direction is very slow.
Management of certain waste types arising from technological, natural or military emergencies also needs regulation. Current rules address this only piecemeal. Ineffective regulation of destruction debris and the absence of a strategic commitment to a circular economy mean this waste continues to pollute the environment, pose health risks and remain outside the economy. The environmental ministry’s permitting activities, the lack of an initiative to establish a separate central executive waste management body, and legislation in this area indicate persistent problems with business permitting procedures and support for environmentally harmful illegal activity, particularly in hazardous waste management.
Ukraine’s legislation on industrial pollution still only partially aligns with the EU acquis. The Law ‘On Integrated Industrial Pollution Prevention and Control’, adopted in 2024, is only the first step in the reform. To advance further, Ukraine must translate and approve BAT conclusions as soon as possible and be ready to issue integrated environmental permits to new installations according to European standards when the law enters into force in August 2025. Introducing BAT at existing installations has been postponed until martial law ends. The technical chapters and annexes of the relevant EU directive covering specific installation types have still not been fully transposed.
Ukraine’s achievements in climate policydeserve recognition, including adoption of a framework law on state climate policy, approval of the National Energy and Climate Plan, and legislation on fluorinated greenhouse gases. These steps lay the foundations for systematic climate policy and alignment with EU law. However, there remains a need to update the low-emission development strategy under the Paris Agreement, adapt policy to the Fit for 55 package, ratify the Kigali Amendment and establish an effective emissions monitoring and trading system. We therefore call on Ukraine’s Government to urgently update its long-term low-emission development strategy using current scientific scenarios and accounting for new wartime challenges; align climate policy with EU standards, including the Fit for 55 package;;, ratify the Kigali Amendment and complete the emissions monitoring and trading system.
We also call on the Government to address systemic environmental sector problems that, in our view, require immediate reconsideration and action:
1) Ukraine is transposing EU legislation but postponing actual environmental reforms until after the war: environmental monitoring, BAT at existing installations, waste management and so on);
2) the state is actively expanding the environmental datasets it collects in electronic databases but, citing the war, conceals them from the public;
3) existing environmental protection tools have been placed under a wartime ‘moratorium’. Scheduled environmental inspections have not taken place anywhere in Ukraine for more than three years; unscheduled inspections are significantly obstructed; all reporting, including to the PRTR and on compliance with air emission permits, is voluntary; and liability for failure to fulfil these obligations does not apply during martial law.
4) the shortage of natural ecosystems, declining biodiversity and the adverse effects of hostilities on soils require simpler legislation and regulations for land conservation and restoration of natural ecosystems and biodiversity.